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Greening Arctic Cruise Shipping Through Law and 
Technology: A Role for China? 
 
Stefan Kirchner 
 
 
Increased shipping in the Arctic will mean not only increasing tourism revenue for local communities but, more importantly in 
the long run, increasing health risks for local residents. The overwhelming majority of ships is powered with fossil fuels and 
concerns over emissions have led to the creation of Emission Control Areas, such as the Sulphur Emissions Control Area 
(SECA) in the Baltic Sea, the North Sea and along much, but not all, of the coasts of the United States and Canada. None 
of the existing SECAs includes areas north of the Arctic Circle. This means that coastal communities, in particular in cruise 
ship destinations, are put at risk from high emissions of SO2. The research presented here shows that China has the potential 
to play several roles in contributing to the protection of coastal communities in the Arctic and in safeguarding the human right 
to live in a healthy environment, which has long been recognized by the European Court of Human Rights. It will be shown 
that China has the potential to use international forms of cooperation in the context of the work of the International Maritime 
Organization in order to support the establishment of a SECA for the entire Arctic Ocean but can also profit from it in the 
long run, provided that China’s shipbuilding industry becomes able to meet the needs of more environment conscious ship buyers. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Cruise shipping is booming globally — and in the Arctic in particular (Nilsen, 2018; Wright, 2018). 
As the Arctic is undergoing unprecedented changes, it is becoming a desired travel destination. In 
light of the fragility of the Arctic marine environment and the multiple effects of cruise shipping 
on the natural environment as well as on coastal communities, ensuring at least a minimum level 
of sustainability of cruise operations requires international regulation. This will likely involve non-
regional actors, in particular countries whose citizens are particularly active in Arctic tourism. 
For some time, China has been pushing for more recognition and a more active role in Arctic 
affairs by trying to get more involved in regional decision-making processes. A case in point is 
China’s involvement with the Arctic Council where China has gained Observer status. For the self-
styled “near Arctic” state, this is an important achievement as China has long sought a seat at the 
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table. These efforts are not an end in themselves. China has economic and security interests in the 
Arctic, both of which can raise concerns among Arctic nations. In order to gain support - or at 
least a lack of opposition - from Arctic states for China’s Arctic ambitions, it appears likely that 
Arctic states’ governments will have to see positive sides to China’s Arctic ascendance. In other 
words, China’s involvement in the region might face resistance or at least resentment1 unless it is 
seen as beneficial for Arctic states and local communities. 
While China’s official role in cruise tourism is still relatively limited, the large number of Chinese 
visitors to the Arctic give China an interest in the region and in the well-being of their citizens. 
Likewise, states, like China, should not overlook the impact tourism has on local communities. 
Accordingly, the well-being of local residents in tourism areas should also be taken into account 
by the home countries of visitors. While the sovereignty of the receiving states prevents tourists’ 
home states from taking direct action, a cooperative effort aimed at safeguarding the rights and 
interests of local communities in tourism regions is in the interest of all sides. The sustainability of 
Arctic tourism can benefit from the involvement of the home countries to tourists who visit the 
Arctic. This can be done through raising tourists’ awareness of local conditions and the needs of 
local communities prior to departure or by influencing international legal frameworks relevant for 
tourism activities. This text is concerned with the latter aspect. 
It will be shown that there might indeed be a way for China to actually make a positive contribution 
which benefits the people who live in the Arctic. One way to do so, and the focus of this article, 
would be for China to take an active role in protecting Arctic coastal communities against air 
pollution from ships. While such action might not provide immediate benefits for China, it could 
increase acceptance of Chinese tourism-related activities by local communities in the Arctic. This 
is a factor which is not to be underestimated because for many small Arctic communities, the 
current tourism boom, which is to a significant degree fueled by Chinese visitors, is a mixed 
blessing: local economic benefits clash with the environmental and cultural costs of opening up to 
mass tourism of questionable sustainability. Reducing the air pollution caused by cruise vessels 
operating in the Arctic is one way to protect coastal communities. 
In order to assess the likelihood of such a move, different aspects will be investigated, in particular 
the current state of international law when it comes to protecting Arctic coastal communities from 
vessel-source air pollution, green shipping technology and China’s Arctic policies, as evidenced by 
the nation’s 2018 Arctic White Paper (People’s Republic of China, 2018). 
Shipping in the Arctic 
Climate Change Opens Up a New Ocean 
As climate change leads to a dramatic reduction in Arctic sea ice cover, Arctic shipping is becoming 
more feasible both technologically and economically. While some shipping companies are using 
Arctic shipping routes as a marketing tool (for example in the case of the highly publicized Crystal 
Serenity cruise through the Northwest Passage (AFP, 2016)), a large part of the cargo shipping 
which is currently undertaken in the Arctic Ocean is regional in nature, largely concentrating on 
Russia’s Northern coastline, for example between Sabetta and China. Trans-Arctic shipping has 
the potential to provide shipping companies with significant savings due to a route e.g. between 
Europe and East-Asia. The Arctic alternative is not only shorter than currently preferred route, 
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through the Suez Canal or around Africa, but also safer than waters along these routes which 
continue to be plagued by piracy, albeit to a lesser extent than was the case a few years ago. Such 
economic and security incentives and the continued reduction of Arctic sea ice cover due to 
climate change make Arctic shipping, including cruise shipping (cf. Sloan, 2018), more likely in the 
future — a development for which the Arctic is not yet prepared sufficiently (see Struzik, 2018; 
cf. also Steward et al., 2007). 
In addition, the Arctic is an attractive destination for cruise tour operators. Next to extractive 
industries, including for the energy sector, maritime transport is one of the key potentials for the 
advancement of economic development in the Arctic (Gauthier, 2017: 2) and the current boom in 
cruise tourism in the Arctic is a double-edged sword. The impact of the increasing interest of the 
tourism industry can already be felt in many parts of the Arctic and China plays an important role 
in it. This role ranges from the large number of Chinese tourists who are visiting the Arctic to 
Chinese-run business operations, such as hotels. When it comes to cruise tourism, the impact of 
increasing visitor numbers is felt in particular in small locations: for small coastal communities 
which host passenger vessels with hundreds or thousands of tourists, the current boom is a mixed 
blessing: while tourists generate some income, the local economic benefit is often restricted to 
souvenir shops (local residents in Arctic cruise tourism destinations hope to profit from the sale 
of souvenirs, such as locally made works of art2 (Brown, 2016). Many products needed on board 
the ship (including food for passengers and crew members) are sourced far from the Arctic 
destinations prior to departure. As a result, the potential for profit by local actors in Arctic 
communities is severely limited since many of the passengers’ needs will already be met on board. 
But there are also serious environmental and health concerns (ibid.), in particular due to the air 
pollution caused by ships. While Arctic cruise shipping has the potential to provide income for 
small coastal communities in remote Arctic regions (Kassam, 2016), there are concerns about 
potential disasters, which could have dramatic impacts on local livelihoods (ibid.). The long-term 
effects of the Exxon Valdez oil spill not only on the environment but also on local economies have 
not been forgotten in the Arctic. Also ships other than oil tankers, just carrying bunker fuel, can 
cause significant damage to the marine environment. The sinking of the MS Explorer in the 
Antarctic Ocean in 2007, to give just one example,3 triggered a significant oil spill which negatively 
impacted local wildlife (Associated Press, 2007). 
Air Pollution by Ships 
Cruise vessels not only bring tourists but also pollution to the Arctic: in the absence of land-based 
energy supplies, the ships’ engines have to be kept running in order to supply the ship with energy, 
in particular electricity. Dock-side electricity supplies remain expensive and rare, and because many 
of today’s ships still rely on heavy fuels, ship engines are a significant source of air pollution, which 
leads to negative health effects for coastal residents. This problem is not restricted to cruise vessels, 
but due to high energy needs and stays close to the shore, cruise vessels are a particularly important 
source of air pollution when it comes to coastal communities in the Arctic. Among the most 
problematic pollutants emitted by ships are sulphur-oxides (SOx). As will be shown below, their 
prevalence has already led to a number of legal responses by the IMO. Other negative health 
effects are caused for example by emissions of carbon-dioxide (CO2), a problem which has come 
into the focus of international maritime environmental lawyers more recently. 
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A Role for International Law 
International law has long played a role in the Arctic Ocean. Already in 1958, on the occasion of 
Alaskan statehood, it was noted that “[i]ncreased human activity in the [Arctic] area, particularly 
when great Powers are involved, naturally results in international problems” (Hayton, 1958: 746) 
and that international law has a role to play in solving these problems (ibid.). Specifically, 
international law has an important role to play in the protection of the Arctic marine environment 
against vessel-source pollution (Kirchner, 2017). While the establishment of Particularly Sensitive 
Sea Areas (PSSAs) currently still requires an existing shipping-based threat to the marine 
environment (see in detail Kirchner, 2017), which makes the establishment of a PSSA in waters 
which are not (yet) used for shipping difficult (Kirchner, 2017), environmental standards which 
directly target vessels are also applicable in the Arctic and can be used to protect the Arctic marine 
environment and the coastal communities. 
The Polar Code 
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) is the 
central international legal instrument when it comes to regulating pollution by ships. Both 
MARPOL and the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) provide the 
legal background for the Polar Code which entered into force on 1 January 2017. The Polar Code 
is meant to protect both safety at sea and the marine environment (Polar Code, Introduction, 
Section 1).   
The Polar Code did not come out of a vacuum but was the result of many years of law-making 
efforts on the soft law level (on the development see Jensen, 2016). The 1989 Exxon Valdez 
disaster served as the initial point of departure for these efforts to develop specific rules which 
govern navigation in Arctic and Antarctic waters (Jensen, 2016). Almost three decades later, a 
binding legal framework exists which aims at making navigation in polar waters safer than ever 
before. Although vessel operations in polar waters remain inherently dangerous, the Polar Code 
establishes rules, which enable ship operators and crew members to take active measures to 
enhance safety at sea. The Polar Code is mandatory for all ships which fly the flag of states which 
are parties to SOLAS or MARPOL (ibid.). The Polar Code may also be considered to amount to 
generally accepted international rules and standards, for example in the context of Article 21 (2) 
LOSC or Article 211 (2) and 5 (5) LOSC (see in detail Jensen, 2016). In particular, Article 211 (5), 
read in conjunction with the Polar Code, will allow coastal states to impose environmental 
standards on vessels which are passing through their Exclusive Economic Zones (Jensen, 2016). 
Interestingly, it can be argued that by invoking Article 234 LOSC, coastal states can set even stricter 
standards than those which are laid down in the Polar Code (ibid.).  
Although it is in many ways a technical document (ibid.), the Polar Code is not only about technical 
standards but also about people (Kirchner, 2017a). While safety of seafarers is an issue in particular 
for newcomers to the Arctic (Polar Code, Introduction, Section 3.1.7, cf. also Kirchner/Pääkkölä, 
2016), coastal communities, which are particularly endangered by Arctic shipping (cf. Kirchner, 
2016), are barely mentioned in the Polar Code (Polar Code, Preamble, para. 4; but see also Polar 
Code, Introduction, Section 1). However, as outlined earlier, the potential negative effects of 
Arctic shipping on coastal communities, are not insignificant.  
 
Arctic Yearbook 2018   
  
Greening Arctic Cruise Shipping  
5 
SOx and CO2 
Because the Polar Code was written from the perspective of safety and the environment, its 
inspirational moment, the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster, remains tangible under the surface of the 
text. The Polar Code aims at preventing accidents which result in dangers to human life and / or 
the environment. Oil spills are a classical example for accident-based forms of environmental harm 
at sea. Air pollution by ships, on the other hand, is not the result of disasters but a consequence 
of the normal course of operations of vessels. It is therefore necessary to approach the issue 
differently.  
The IMO has done so by establishing specific Sulphur Emission Control Areas (SECAs) in areas 
of particular concern. In these areas, many of which, for example the SECA for the Baltic Sea, 
also are close to population centers, ships fuels must not contain more than 0.1% sulphur m/m. 
In the Arctic, no such limitation exists at this time, but as of 1 January 2020, a general limit of 0.5 
% sulphur m/m will be imposed on ship fuels worldwide.   
This trend is noteworthy in that the next step in this development is already visible on the horizon. 
In early 2018, efforts were underway at the IMO to tackle the issue of CO2 emissions by ships. 
This is noteworthy in particular because the shipping industry did not play a role in the 2015 Paris 
Climate Accords. From an international law perspective, the end of heavy fuels in shipping is 
getting in sight. For coastal communities as well as for passengers on cruise ships, these 
developments are of direct importance due to the negative health effects of ship emissions. As 
long as fossil fuels will be used in ship propulsion systems, the problem of emissions will persist. 
While there are already a number of different technical efforts to make shipping greener, from 
solar cells to Flettner rotors (rotating cylinders which use the Magnus effect to generate forward 
propulsion), the shipping industry is still far away from being environmentally friendly. 
China’s Contribution?  
How then can China make an active contribution to the wellbeing of residents in Arctic coastal 
communities in a field which is of increasing interest for the People’s Republic? 
China in the Arctic 
Although the Arctic has been of interest for legal scholars for a long time (see Hayton, 1958), 
interest in the region has dramatically grown, also among lawyers, in recent years. The Far North, 
which was long seen as inhospitable, has attracted a large number of new actors from around the 
world, largely due to the increased accessibility made possible by climate change. While climate 
change already has dramatic impacts on communities in the Arctic, in particular on indigenous 
communities which are dependent on the natural environment for their livelihoods, the changing 
climate also makes large parts of the Arctic more accessible (Tiainen et al., 2015: 132). More so 
than most non-Arctic countries, China has played (and continues to play) an important role in this 
development: Chinese demand for natural resources is a key factor in price increases and for the 
growing interest for example in mining in the Arctic (ibid.). In addition, the Arctic Ocean is 
becoming an important route for the transport of raw materials and natural resources to China 
(for example gas from Russia’s Far North) and has the potential to provide a shorter (and therefore 
cheaper) route for the transport of Chinese-made products from China e.g., to Europe. While 
maritime transport is an important topic, for example in the context of China’s One Belt – One 
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Road (OBOR) initiative, the economic interests of the People’s Republic in the Arctic include a 
range of issues. Increased accessibility of the Arctic also makes investments in the region (for 
example in the extractive industries or in tourism) more profitable (Tiainen et al., 2015: 132). This 
is particularly the case because the trend of increased accessibility of the Arctic is likely to continue 
in the foreseeable future (ibid). It therefore appears likely that China will have a long-term interest 
in the Arctic. This in turn means that such economic interests are likely to take on a political and 
legal dimension and this can already be seen in China’s increasing emphasis on involvement in the 
shaping of Arctic Law. One way in which China is already active today is in fisheries: together with 
the Arctic 5, Iceland, Japan, South Korea and the European Union, the People’s Republic signed 
the agreement to establish a fisheries moratorium for the Central Arctic Ocean in Ilulissat on 3 
October 2018. 
Although in practice mainly relevant for communities in the Arctic, the Polar Code, which applies 
in the Arctic as well as in Antarctic waters, it was a created on a global level, under the auspices of 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO). This means that China had a small part to play in 
this development, although many other states have been more active than China in the process. 
As Arctic shipping will likely become more important for China’s economy, which depends on the 
export of products and the import of raw materials, it appears likely that China’s interest in shaping 
the rules of Arctic shipping will grow.4 Already today, China’s government, in line with China’s 
diverse (political, economic, legal etc.) interests in the Arctic (Shi et al., 2018) wants to play a role 
in governing activities in the Arctic, including shipping (Wong, 2018): “By defining China as a 
near-Arctic state, ensuring that China has become an observer on the Arctic Council and has 
intensified its investments in Arctic research, China’s government has increased its focus on the 
Arctic” (Zeuthen, 2017: 2). 
Technical and Legal Options 
China essentially has two options on how it can contribute to the reduction of the dangers which 
follow from air pollution by vessels: the technical solution could consist in China’s ship-building 
industries trying to become competitive producers of ‘green’ vessels. In particular in light of the 
expected stricter environmental standards for the shipping industry, a conscious move towards 
the production of greener vessels could be an important step forward for shipbuilders in China, 
in particular as the industry is already a global leader in terms of volume and the Chinese 
shipbuilding industry is about to undergo a major consolidation, which could free up production 
capacities, while at the same time Chinese-built vessels are not necessarily the first choice for 
buyers seeking vessels for operations in the Far North. A legal approach could be two-fold, for 
example imposing stricter emission limits on ships flying the flag of the People’s Republic or taking 
a more active role in shaping international legal standards which pertain to air pollution by ships.  
In the following, this text will look at the likelihood of such a move towards active advocacy for 
the reduction of ship emissions in the Arctic by the People’s Republic. Particular attention will be 
given to the overall vision of the Chinese government with regard to China’s place in the Arctic in 
general, its interests, as well as China’s role in legal decision-making and law-making in the Arctic 
in particular. In other words, the following section will look at China’s role in shaping Arctic Law 
in a field which is particularly relevant for the health and well-being of local coastal communities 
in the Arctic. 
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Emphasis on Cooperation and International Law 
China’s emphasis, at least in public statements concerning the Arctic, on the importance of 
international law can strengthen its role in the Arctic (Koivurova, 2018). This would especially be 
the case if the focus would shift from regional law-making, for example in the framework created 
under the auspices of the Arctic Council,5 towards more universal legal frameworks, such as the 
Law of the Sea Convention (cf. ibid.). While China’s government has disregarded international 
legal norms, including those of the LOSC, closer to home, in the Arctic the People’s Republic of 
China uses international law as a tool to gain access to decision-making processes. In practice, in 
the Arctic, China’s actions match the government’s claims which have been laid out in the 2018 
Arctic Policy White Paper (ibid.). There is therefore, despite systematic violations of international 
law by China elsewhere, for example in the South China Sea or on issues such as fundamental 
human rights, at least some reason to expect that China would honor international legal obligations 
in the Arctic context. This would correspond to a widely held practice between Arctic nations that 
cooperation has long been possible, for example during the Cold War, despite serious political 
differences between Arctic states over other matters. Cooperation across international borders is 
an essential element of Arctic governance (Davidson, 2015: 1) and often this means cooperation 
across political divides. The Search and Rescue exercises conducted by Norway, a NATO member 
state, and Russia in Spring 2018 are a reminder of the importance attached by Arctic states to 
reliable cooperation across political divides. By honoring international legal agreements in the 
Arctic, China could present itself as a reliable partner for Arctic nations. Taking an active role in 
reducing the effects of air pollution by ships could provide an important step in this direction. 
International governance of the Arctic is – to very large degrees - based on the Arctic Council6 
and the Law of the Sea Convention (Escudé, 2016: 49). China has a chair at both tables, albeit not 
a voice at the former. The law of the sea provides a framework which already today provides China 
with access to the decision-making which affects the Arctic. The Law of the Sea Convention is 
particularly relevant for the Arctic: unlike in the case of Antarctica only a small portion of the 
Arctic, the High Seas part of the Central Arctic Ocean, does not fall under some form of legal 
power wielded by Arctic states, be it land territory, waters under full coastal state sovereignty (such 
as the territorial seas) or parts of the sea to which coastal states hold sovereign rights (for example 
the Exclusive Economic Zones) (Koivurova, 2013: 443). Aside from exceptions such as Svalbard 
(see Koivurova et al., 2017), the presence of state actors severely limits the role non-Arctic states 
can play in the region. It also means that China’s focus on cooperation through international law 
is understandable as international legal instruments which are created outside of the framework 
provided by the Arctic Council can be influenced by non-Arctic states. While there might be 
political concerns about China’s increasing role in the Arctic, including in Arctic Law, in some 
Arctic states, this approach can actually turn out to be beneficial of coastal communities in the 
Arctic – in the (admittedly not too likely) event that China becomes serious about combatting air 
pollution (and the continued reliance on coal in China seems to indicate that this is hardly the 
case). 
China’s role as an actor in the Arctic is growing (Sellheim et al., 2017: 9) but “China’s Arctic 
aspirations are under close scrutiny by the Arctic community” (ibid: 5). If China wants to play a 
meaningful role in the Arctic it will need the acceptance of other actors in the Arctic, in particular 
Arctic states and the peoples they represent. Merely reaping economic benefits at the expense of 
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the Arctic natural environment and the people who live in the Arctic will not endear outside actors 
to decision-makers in the Arctic. Therefore, there will have to be tangible benefits for Arctic states 
in order to open the door to newcomers. Despite its claims, China remains a relative newcomer 
to the Arctic. For example, unlike other states from outside the Arctic, between 1998 and 2015 
China has not played a role in preparing the reports of the Arctic Marine Assessment Programme 
(AMAP) (Spence, 2016: 80 et seq.), which would have been an indicator of China’s bona fide 
willingness to be involved with protecting the Arctic marine environment.7  
China has described Arctic issues as “trans-regional and global” (Sellheim et al., 2017: 4). This can 
be cause for concern if it is to be understood as limiting the reach of Arctic states. Although China 
recognizes the established rights of Arctic states (ibid), by emphasizing the transnational dimension 
of the Arctic, China can create the impression that it sees its interests as competing with that of 
the Arctic nation states, although in other contexts the Chinese government has regularly 
emphasized the importance of national sovereignty. 
In the Arctic, international law, rather than politics, seems to dominate China’s actions (ibid.:9), 
which is a welcome departure from the behavior of the People’s Republic elsewhere: China’s 2018 
Arctic Policy White Paper (China’s Arctic Policy (CAP) 2018, see also Koivurova, 2018 and 
Hossain, 2018) emphasizes the protection of the Arctic environment (CAP, 2018: IV. 2. (1)), which 
also includes efforts “to enhance control of the sources of marine pollution, such as ship discharge, 
offshore dumping, and air pollution” (CAP, 2018: IV. 2. (1)). It is, however, not fully clear if the 
term “control” refers only to the enforcement of existing norms or also to the introduction of 
stricter standards and other measures aimed at protecting the Arctic marine environment. 
From a legal perspective, China could take action in international fora, such as the IMO, to 
advocate in favor of stricter environmental and health standards for the Arctic region. While it is 
unlikely that China would do so directly, it could become a leader when it comes to sustainable 
shipping — and thereby pursue the same aim indirectly.8 In that way, the People’s Republic of 
China can make a positive contribution to reducing air pollution by vessels and to the health of 
the people who live in Arctic coastal communities. From a technical perspective, Chinese 
shipbuilders have an economic incentive to compete with shipbuilders from other nations in 
producing vessels, which are fit for operations in polar waters. A focus on green shipping 
technologies would allow Chinese shipbuilding companies to catch up technically with 
shipbuilding companies from other parts of the world, in particular from Europe.  
Concluding Remarks 
When keeping in mind China’s environmental policies at home as well as the disregard for human 
rights, including the right to health, it seems questionable at first whether China might actually 
pursue such a course of action. In the Arctic, however, China has to – and appears to be – 
following other rules. Cooperation across borders is essential in the Arctic and non-Arctic states 
such as China will be dependent on the cooperation of Arctic states in order to be able to do 
business in the Arctic. Cooperation with Arctic states will usually require predictability as a partner, 
which in turn will require compliance with international agreements which apply in the Arctic. So 
far, China appears to honor international law in its activities in the Arctic. Utilizing international 
law as a tool to contribute to the provision of practical benefits for Arctic communities might 
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provide long term benefits for China in the form of increased access to cooperation with Arctic 
states. 
For the time being, air pollution by ships remains a significant concern for coastal communities. 
While steps have already been taken by the IMO, a more complete transition towards greener 
shipping technologies will be inevitable in the long run. China has the technical and legal means 
to contribute to an improvement of the situation. It remains to be seen in how for China’s 
commitment to international law and cooperation, including in the fight against air pollution by 
ships, which has been affirmed in the government’s Arctic Policy White Paper in early 2018, will 
actually be implemented with a view towards the wellbeing of the people who live in the Arctic. 
 
 
Notes 
1. On different attitudes towards China’s increasing importance in the Arctic see Takeshima, 
2013: 73 et seq. 
2. This also raises concerns regarding the protection of traditional indigenous knowledge, on 
this see Wheelersburg et al., 2017. 
3. From a human perspective, the increase of cruise tourism in the Antarctic Ocean turned 
out to be beneficial as 154 passengers and crew members of the MS Explorer were rescued 
by a Norwegian cruise ship only three hours after abandoning the vessel and entering 
lifeboats (Associated Press, 2007). On the lack of search and rescue (SAR) infrastructure 
in the Arctic, which remains a serious problem, see Gramer, 2018.  
4. For an earlier call for China to take a more active role in standard-setting regarding Arctic 
shipping see Liu et al., 2017. 
5. The development of binding international treaties by the Arctic states while using the 
framework provided by the Arctic Council is a relatively recent phenomenon. On the 
original idea behind the creation of the Arctic Council see Bloom 1999, on the making of 
Arctic Law see Sellheim et al., 2017:4 et seq. 
6. On the importance of the role played by the Arctic Council in shaping norms applicable 
to the Arctic – initially soft law but in recent years also binding international treaties – see 
Escudé, 2016: 51 et seq. 
7. Earlier, environmental concerns apparently were perceived by China as a possibility for 
cooperation rather than as a concern in its own right (cf. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2010). This approach was also visible in the inactive role 
played by China in the drafting of the Polar Code (Bognar, 2017: 5). 
8. Such an approach would be consistent with the country (which is emitting more 
greenhouse gases than the European Union and the United States together 
(Bradsher/Friedman, 2018)) in terms of climate action, at least since the election of Donald 
Trump as President of the United States (see Wong, 2018). 
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